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. Robinson LADB news analyst The inauguration last month of the new Guatemalan president,
Jorge Serrano Elias, is the first succession from one civilian government to another since the CIAinspired 1954 coup d'etat ushered in three decades of nearly uninterrupted military regimes. The
"political opening" which led to the election of Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo in 1985 was
touted in Washington and elsewhere as the culmination of the "transition to democracy." However,
Guatemala remains a society characterized by some of the sharpest economic inequalities and
social cleavage in the hemisphere, a dramatic deterioration of the human rights situation, endemic
political violence, and the longest-running guerrilla insurgency in Latin America. Although the
recent elections were not fraudulent, and certified by international observers as "free and fair,"
with the exception of one small center-left coalition, the vote was a contest between factions of
the right and ultra-right. Citizens' lack of confidence in the elections and their potential to resolve
fundamental problems was expressed in an abstention rate of nearly 60%. The question now is
whether electoral democracy can address the vital issues and urgent problems facing Guatemalan
society. If a "transition to democracy" is to have any meaning, say observers, the new government
will have to move quickly to restore human rights guarantees; address socio-economic inequalities
that are tearing the country apart, which in turn requires challenging the tremendous political clout
that the private sector enjoys; and, curtail the military's power and impunity. The backdrop which
delineates Serrano's ability to move in any of the above areas (and it is not at all clear that these
are indeed his goals) is a myriad of shifting economic and political interests and their interplay
with military factions. This complex panorama places constraints on the new government but also
provides it with maneuvering room. Wither human rights? One of the promises of the "democratic
opening" was precisely the restoration of human rights in a country where up to 100,000 people have
been assassinated and 40,000 "disappeared" by government security forces and right-wing death
squads since 1954, apart from indiscriminate massacres of the rural counterinsurgency campaigns.
A report released at the end of Vinicio Cerezo's term by the independent Guatemalan Human
Rights Committee documented the extrajudicial execution of 2,429 people between 1986-1990, the
disappearance of 559, and the massacre (assassination of three or more people at the same time)
of 209. Yet, with few exceptions, none of the presidential candidates spoke out on human rights,
thus marginalizing the issue from campaign debates. Serrano was careful during the campaign to
reiterate that he would take no action against persons responsible for past human rights violations.
The Washington-based human rights watchdog group, Americas Watch, called on Serrano "to
bring an end to the impunity enjoyed by those that assassinate, torture and disappear hundreds of
civilians every year." The current escalation of abuses, said the organization, marks a "qualitative
change." Higher-level political leaders and activists are now being attacked, and repression is
again moving from selective to generalized targets. The escalation of human rights abuses has
once again placed Guatemala in the international spotlight. The massacre of 14 civilians by Army
soldiers in the indigenous community of Santiago, Atitlan, last December 2, ignited an avalanche
of international protest. The killings prompted the West German government to suspend military
aid, and further strained US-Guatemala relations. The State Department suspended $2.8 million in
military aid in December, after charging that the Cerezo government had done little to investigate
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the slaying of US citizen Michael DeVine in June 1990, apparently by government security forces.
In September 1990, the directors of a US Agency for Internation Development (USAID) program to
improve Guatemala's judicial system cancelled the program after accusing government and military
authorities of refusing to investigate, much less prosecute, those implicated in cases of "political
violence." Harvard University's Criminal Justice Center, under USAID auspices, commenced
the program in 1987. Four years later, the program directors concluded that they managed to
improve judicial processing in cases of common crimes, but that no progress whatsoever was
made on cases of "political violence" due to "lack of will" from authorities. In this lopsided judicial
system, they concluded, the "rich and powerful" remain above the rule of law. Edmundo Vasquez,
president of the Supreme Court of Justice, agreed with the US specialists. Two days before Serrano's
inauguration, he said the country's judicial system "is in clear violation of human rights, a system
totally beyond reason, from the Middle Ages." Guatemalan human rights organizations presented
testimony on abuses to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, which met in Geneva in
mid-February, and requested that the Commission appoint a special UN investigator. Serrano
sent a delegation to lobby against a formal condemnation of the country, and also rejected a
special investigator, arguing that either measure would hamper the new government's own efforts
to deal with the situation. Although a moral offense to the international community, human
rights violations in Guatemala are neither arbitrary nor an aberration in an otherwise functional
"transition to democracy." Democratization or militarization? In contrast to several South American
countries, where military regimes placed on the defensive by mass protests were forced to return
government to civilians, in Guatemala the "democratic opening" came about as part and parcel
of the military's strategy for suppressing popular and revolutionary movements and reorganizing
society. There were two stages in this construct. In the first, Guatemalan society had to first be
"cleansed" of armed insurgency and popular movements. Between 1983 and 1985 upwards to
150,000 peasants were killed in rural counterinsurgency campaigns, and the popular and trade union
movement decimated in urban repression. In the second stage, the military turned nominal control
of government over to a civilian administration, a move seen as necessary to overcome the country's
international isolation, restore stability and modernize the economy. Some have referred to the
military's ideological outlook and political project for Guatemala as a local version of the "national
security state" or the "counterinsurgency state." The Guatemalan Army, however, coined its own
term: the "National Stability Doctrine." The Guatemalan military has been transformed through this
process from an instrument of the traditional oligarchy into an institution unto itself, accumulating
economic power, penetrating (and restricting) civil society, and consolidating a presence in
governmental institutions. In addition, the military played the key role in designing the juridical
and procedural rules for civilian government, including a constitution which gives impunity to past
human rights violations by the armed forces, provides the military with nearly unchallenged control
over social, economic and political life in counterinsurgency areas, and a judicial system under
which the military enjoys immunity. A UN report on Guatemala last October concluded that "the
army is clearly an independent center of power in Guatemala and is not accountable to the civilian
government." Nevertheless, the return to civilian rule was more than theater for foreign observers.
In the first years of the Cerezo administration, government-organized repression and human rights
violations dramatically declined, and many civil and political liberties were restored, prompting
thousands of exiles to return. Unions, peasant organizations and popular groups began to organize
openly again on a mass scale for the first time since 1980, when widespread repression forced
most of those groups to demobilize or operate underground. Rather than the "culmination" of a
democratic transition, the return to civilian government represented the initiation of a circumscribed
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transition. As Cerezo took office in 1986, the question was whether the civilian government would
have the political will and the power to sustain and expand the democratic opening, and to enact
desperately needed reforms. During his first two years in office, Cerezo introduced numerous
initiatives to extend civilian control over the military, and to bring about basic social, economic and
juridical reforms. His government created new police entities under civilian authority, attempted to
introduce a progressive tax package that would increase government revenue and facilitate minimal
income redistribution, tried to investigate new human rights violations (which, although greatly
reduced, continued), raised the minimum wage, and negotiated a temporary "social pact" with
trade unions. However, these measures sparked fierce opposition from the conservative business
community and extremist factions in the military. In May 1988, these factions attempted a coup
d'etat. Although the putsch failed, it sent a chill over all reform efforts and unleashed a new wave
of rights violations, including the closure of independent media outlets. In the months following
the abortive coup, disappearances and assassinations tripled. In effect, since 1988 the Cerezo
government put all reform efforts on ice, concentrating instead on mere survival. By late 1988, the
guerrilla insurgency had reemerged as a political-military force, and a wave of strikes in the cities
and land takeovers in the countryside escalated national tensions, prompting a second coup attempt
on the anniversary of the first, in May 1989. After the second abortive coup, Guatemala spiralled
into yet another wave of repression, political intrigue and rumors of impending military rebellions.
Analysts say the opening of the electoral campaign in early 1990 that averted a collapse into
complete anarchy; political energies were directed toward the electoral process. Economic growth,
exacerbation of inequality During Cerezo's administration, the Guatemalan economy rebounded
from the negative growth rates of the early 1980s, achieving an average rate of 2.5 to 4% between
1986 and 1990. However, economic expansion did little to alleviate poverty, and in fact appeared
to exacerbate income inequalities. According to statistics from the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 82% of all Guatemalans live in "total impoverishment,"
up from 49% in 1985. Over 60% of the population is un- or underemployed. Of Guatemala's 10
million people, 67% are illiterate. Infant mortality is 73.3 per thousand live births one of the highest
in the world and 82% of Guatemalan children are malnourished. It is estimated that a family of
five requires the equivalent of $100 per month for subsistence, compared to the minimum monthly
wage of $50. At the roots of this impoverishment, say critics, is an extremely unequal distribution of
wealth and one of the most backward patterns of land tenure in the hemisphere. The richest 20%
of the population receives 55% of national income, compared to the poorest 20% with only 4.8%.
Although 60% of the population labors in the agricultural sector, fewer than 2% of landowners own
65% of all arable land. On the other extreme, 78% of the rural population subsists on just 10% of
the land. In a country where government revenue amounts to only 9% of GDP probably the lowest
in the world the rightist business community has for decades exercised a veto over any attempt,
not only to redistribute wealth, but to minimally improve the government's revenue base through
income and property taxes. In a public message to the new administration, the head of the Roman
Catholic Church, Archbishop Prospero Penados del Barrio, called on Serrano to "convince large
landowners to abandon their selfishness and share their wealth," and to "implement an agrarian
reform which gives the peasants land on which they can live and produce adequately." Yet Serrano,
like the other candidates, was fearful of antagonizing powerful landed and business interests and
their military backers: he promised that there would be no agrarian reform during the election
campaign. Economic growth under the Cerezo government was based on the expansion of nontraditional exports and an inflow of foreign loans, together with inconsistent liberalization measures.
The private sector's adamant opposition to several initiatives introduced by the administration
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actually aggravated macroeconomic distortions. These initiatives included a tax package that
could have increased government revenues, and social reforms potentially capable of bringing
new economic agents into play. Instead, the private sector insisted on measures such as multiple
exchange rates that raised exporters' personal income at the expense of a rising government deficit.
Consequently, the economic policies implemented during the Cerezo administration produced
large fiscal deficits, an increase in foreign debt, rising balance of payments deficits, price distortions,
and inflationary pressures. Inflation in 1990 was about 60%, the highest in the country's history.
Serrano, a "New Right" conservative, is expected to implement a far-reaching economic stabilization
and structural adjustment program over the next year. A few days after his inauguration, the new
president met with an International Monetary Fund delegation to discuss the program. After the
meeting, he announced a 90-day emergency plan, including a "fiscal amnesty," public spending
cuts, progressive elimination of direct and indirect subsidies on transportation, utilities, and other
services, domestic price liberalization, and implementation of progressive currency devaluations
to "stabilize the exchange rate." The economic package should benefit significant factions of
the private sector and improve the overall macroeconomic environment. However, it will also
antagonize factions closely tied to domestic markets or to privileged access to government resources,
such as protected manufacturers and exporters who benefitted from exchange rate instability.
More important, the neo-liberal package is also bound to further concentrate income and cause
more deterioration in living standards among the nation's poor. Unless the economic program is
accompanied by efforts to redistribute income and resources and to protect the most vulnerable,
Serrano's initiative will fuel existing class tensions and social conflict. In his 1990 year-end report,
the respected Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, affirmed that deteriorating
economic conditions are in fact directly responsible for the escalation of political violence and
human rights abuses in recent months. Serrano and the military Vinicio Cerezo's adoption in
1988 of a "peaceful coexistence" policy vis-a-vis the army, which his administration considered
necessary to ensure the survival of civilian government, demonstrated the military's de facto
veto over civilian decisions and the extent to which the "democratic transition" is circumscribed.
Achieving the demilitarization of society and greater civilian control over the military is the only way
to give renewed meaning to the "democratic opening," and ranks as the single greatest challenge
faced by the newly elected Serrano government. "As long as the government lacks the political
will to face the social and economic problems of the population, the existing situation will not
change; as long as the security forces are repressive and feared, the situation will not change,"
warned de Leon Carpio, in his final report. "The real power is currently held by the military. It
will be a great challenge for Serrano to regain that power." Serrano's project for Guatemala in
addition to economic stabilization and structural adjustment involves greater civilian control over
the instruments of state power vis-a-vis the military, and establishing the rule of law. The rule
of law and effective civilian government are prerequisites for stability and economic recovery.
However, as with the Cerezo government, the issue is less Serrano's intentions than his ability
to muster enough political support, including in the army, to actually pursue these objectives.
In response to a reporter's question, Serrano acknowledged that the military had maintained
control during the Cerezo administration. He then asserted, "In my government, Jorge Serrano
Elias will be in control and my orders will be complied with by the military. When I occupy the
presidency, the power of the military will be defined in strict conformity with the constitution. I
view military power as a bureaucracy, and functions which do not correspond to it must be taken
away." The National Stability Doctrine describes the military as the "spinal column of the state,"
and the permanent guarantor of its institutions. However, the Guatemalan military's version is
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more sophisticated than Southern Cone counterparts' national security doctrines. In contrast to
Southern Cone variants, the Guatemalan generals recognize that "subversion" is rooted in socioeconomic conditions which must also be addressed. In the words of former defense minister Hector
Gramajo, described as the doctrine's chief architect and leader of the "enlightened, modernizing"
military factions: "To win the war is to find the means to oppose the social, economic and political
conditions that favor the foreign enemy." After completing his term in office just as the electoral
campaign began, Gramajo left for Harvard University to study, in his own words, "political strategy"
before his return to political life in Guatemala. The army's expanded role in society since the early
1980s and development of the National Stability Doctrine places it in a peculiar and contradictory
situation vis-a- vis the conglomerate of competing interests in Guatemala. The army is no longer a
simple instrument of the oligarchy and the right (which is itself increasingly fragmented). In fact,
the Stability Doctrine, in arguing that the social structures of poverty and marginalization, and the
voracity of private sector interests, are root causes of instability, constitutes an ideological rupture
of the traditional right and private sector with the "modernizing" elements of the army. Although
the army is able and willing to repress popular mobilizations, these sectors are perceived as beyond
the direct control of the military. Thus, according to the doctrine, the military would like to find
alternative forms of social recourse or management that leave intact Guatemala's basic power
structure. At the same time, the military is a divided institution with strong and diverse extremist
factions. Also, the counterinsurgency effort tends to generate hard-line positions regarding the
maintenance of military control over society, especially among officers of units engaged in field
operations. Mindful of the restricted space in which he must operate, Serrano can be expected to
attempt building alliances with the "modernizing" factions within the military, and to diminish the
influence of extremist factions. In one of his first acts as president, on Jan. 15 Serrano reorganized
the military high command, appointing Gen. Luis Mendoza Garcia as minister of defense, and Gen.
Raul Molina Bedoya, who had been the deputy minister, as army chief of staff. Both are advocates
of the National Stability Doctrine. The military hierarchy reshuffle reflected a certain coincidence
between the "modernizing" factions of the military and the Serrano government. However, as inside
observers pointed out, Serrano initially attempted to appoint Gen. Roberto Mata, former head of
the high command, and a close friend of Cerezo's, as defense minister. But military chiefs vetoed
the appointment. Some optimistic analysts say an alliance of military and civilian forces could
eventually recognize that the status quo itself is destabilizing, and therefore requires change. If or
how such recognition may infuse new life into what more pessimistic analysts say is a moribund
"transition to democracy," remains to be seen. [Part I of the series appeared in the 02/22/91 issue of
the Central America Update.]

-- End --
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